Sunday, July 21, 2019

Stumbling into the future



China's TFR before and after introduction of the one-child policy (Chaparro and Kulkarni 2015). Did that policy really change anything?



The European world has entered "demographic autumn"—on the one hand, fertility rates have fallen below replacement level; on the other, non-European immigration has risen progressively. These two trends can have only one outcome.

A similar demographic autumn is developing in East Asia. In some ways the situation is worse—fertility rates are at their lowest here. The record is held by the provinces of northeastern China, which have a total fertility rate of only 0.75 children per woman (Wang 2018). South Korea has an estimated TFR of 0.96, and a significant number of those births are to immigrant mothers from Southeast Asia (Haas 2018). Japan is doing better only by comparison, with a TFR of 1.4.

As for China as a whole, the rate is officially 1.6 and unofficially 1.05; the authorities revise this statistic upward to include second children who go unreported because they are illegal under the one-child policy (Wang 2018). That policy was scrapped in 2016, yet those second children still seem to be in hiding. Do they really exist? Did they ever? The Chinese government is stuck in a classic quandary: what do you do when you realize you've not been telling the truth?

The truth is that China’s TFR is half of what it needs to maintain its current population. This should be no surprise. In fact, it’s in line with what we see in Taiwan (1.1), in Singapore's Chinese community (1.1), and in Malaysia's Chinese community (1.3). Looking back, one can wonder whether the one-child policy ever had much impact on the TFR (Chaparro and Kulkarni 2015). The decline seems to have deep roots in modern Chinese society:

China faces an intractable and protracted demographic crisis driven by millions of individual family planning choices made by its increasingly wealthy and urbanized population. Policies restricting births imposed by the authorities have played only a contributing role in the drama. Similar aging trends can be seen throughout East Asia, especially in Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong — territories that never had the types of legal restrictions imposed upon mainland Chinese couples.

[...] The current relaxation of family size restrictions is simply too little, too late. Before the policy was completely abolished in 2013, the Chinese government relaxed the one-child policy by allowing 11 million couples in which both spouses had no siblings to have two children. However, by May 2015, only 18 percent of eligible couples had taken advantage of the opportunity. This shows to what extent China's declining fertility is driven by personal considerations, as opposed to public policies.

In October 2015, the country's National Health and Family Planning Commission estimated that some 90 million families would qualify for the new, two-child policy. By the end of the year, however, only two million families had applied for permission to have a second child. China Daily conducted a survey in 2016 which showed that nearly 60 percent of working mothers do not want a second child, citing time and energy needed to raise it. Other concerns of the women included career risks, the pain of childbirth and little faith in their marriages. (O'Reilly 2019)

This problem is made worse by the gender imbalance: fewer girls than boys are being born. China now has 33 million more males than females. Finally, there is no reason to believe that the decline will stop at one child per woman.


Stumbling into the future

China's workforce is already shrinking, and the total population will begin to shrink before the mid-2020s.  The decline could be offset by pro-natalist measures. For instance, men and women could be encouraged to remain in rural areas and small towns, where conditions are better for family formation. To deal with the shrinking workforce, there could be measures to phase out low-paying jobs through automation and robotization. Of course, there must first be a willingness to act. Unfortunately, such willingness is far from evident, to judge by the current denial and inaction.

China will stumble into its demographic future, with one ad hoc solution after another. One of them may be immigration: "[China] currently hosts some 900,000 legal migrants and untold numbers of illegals, most of them factory workers from Vietnam. Also, desperate Chinese bachelors, unable to find Chinese mates because of the gender imbalance, are increasingly marrying Cambodian or Vietnamese women" (O'Reilly 2019). This is not to say that immigrants will be actively recruited. As is already the case, most will come illegally, being lured by jobs and empty housing. The onus will then be on the authorities to act—in the face of opposition not only from the business community but also from the migrants' home countries, many of which provide Chinese industry with valuable raw materials.

The solutions will ultimately depend on the ideological environment. Westerners often believe that the Chinese are intensely nationalist. In reality, there is a range of views within China, with the majority supporting civic nationalism. This is not coincidentally the view that the government promotes, partly out of conviction and partly to co-opt Tibetans, Muslims, and other minorities. Meanwhile, younger, university-educated people are moving toward the globalist consensus that reigns in the West.

One such person is Yinghong Cheng, who went abroad to study and is now a professor at Delaware State University. His latest book has a chapter titled "Racism and Its Agents in China" (Cheng 2019). In it he argues:

As an ideology, racism or racial discourses do not exist for their own sake or by themselves but always reflect power relations that may be addressed in other social hierarchy-based or identity-related discourses. In China today, racial thinking can appear in various discourses addressed to the political and ideological needs of the party-state, cultural and intellectual elites, and ordinary citizens: nationalism, patriotism, statism, social Darwinism, Han Chauvinism (or Hanism), non-Han ethno-nationalism, populism, and the Chinese civilizational supremacism in general (associated with the traditional ethnocentrism of China). (Cheng 2019, p. 241)

Elsewhere, he describes Hanism as “an ultra-ethnic supremacism” that “comes close to racism in its way of essentializing differences in a condescending manner” (Cheng 2019, p. 264). “The anti-Qing Hanist racism and a racial hierarchy of the world are the twin of the discourse of race in modern Chinese history. Like any other racial discourse in the world, they reflect power relations in reality but construct imaginary orders for a racially ideal—or “natural”—world” (Cheng 2019, p. 16). “… the Han political and intellectual elite exploited the social science disciplines of history, archaeology, and ethnology to establish the centrality of the Han blood and ancestors …” (Cheng 2019, p. 7).

Cheng overstates his case when he describes racism as an ideology that always reflects power relations. This is untrue if we examine its core value: preference for one’s kind. Throughout history and prehistory, humans have cared a lot about their kith and kin, even to the point of sacrificing their lives—and this has been no less true in simple societies with no elite or ruling class. Indeed, the oldest societies were essentially clans of related individuals. Furthermore, kinship is key not only to human life but also to the lives of organisms incapable of having ideas, let alone an ideology. 

Please note: I'm not arguing that kin preference is innate (although that argument can be made). I'm simply saying that it predates ideology and has long been the main organizing principle of society. Perhaps it's now obsolete. Perhaps it’s time for us to become self-defining individuals in a global marketplace. That’s the mainstream liberal argument. But that’s not Cheng's argument. He is arguing that kin preference always was wrong, and now we finally have a chance to get rid of it for good—by eliminating the "agents of racism." How this elimination is supposed to happen is not discussed. Indeed, he never applies to himself the sort of painstaking analysis he applies to others.

In all this, Cheng’s thinking is strangely ahistorical. If kinship has always been the basis for human society, perhaps there is a reason. Perhaps it has been the best way to organize social relations. Or perhaps not. Could we at least have a debate without being accused of base motives? Or being eliminated?

A big problem here is cargo-cult reverence for the West, and this reverence extends to the individualism and globalism that has become so dominant in North America and Western Europe, particularly in elite circles. Cheng denounces China for not doing enough to follow their example, while quoting Chinese writers who point to the resulting problems. If that model of society is already problematic in the West, where it has existed for a longer time, has deeper roots in the culture, and has greater chances for success, why should it do better in a country like China?

Cheng further reveals his ahistoricism when he argues that racism suits elite interests. Yes, it did back in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when elites were nation-based. But they haven’t been that way for some time. Elites no longer have a national conscience, particularly in the West. Their self-interest now pushes them to liquidate the nation-state, notably by outsourcing jobs to low-wage countries and by insourcing low-wage labor for jobs that cannot be outsourced in construction, agriculture, and services. It is this two-way movement—and not "racism"—that is steadily increasing the Gini index, the most common measure of the gap between the rich and the poor.

Do China’s elites still have a national conscience? One can wonder. Unfortunately, this question goes unanswered in Cheng's book. Only nationalism is seen as problematic in the new China, and only nationalism is viewed as serving elite interests. Yet globalism, too, exists within a context of power relations. It, too, serves certain interests. 

As China's working population continues to shrink, will the elites push for higher wages so that labor may be used more sparingly? Or will they keep wages down by bringing in migrant labor? Which scenario is more likely if policymaking is in their hands? And which scenario will get better coverage in the Chinese media?


References

Chaparro, R. and K. Kulkarni. (2015). Does high population growth help or hurt economic development? Cases of China and Pakistan. International Journal of Education Economics and Development 6. 162. 10.1504/IJEED.2015.070629.
https://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/abs/10.1504/IJEED.2015.070629

Cheng, Y. (2019). Discourses of Race and Rising China. Palgrave Macmillan
https://books.google.ca/books?id=ht-GDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=fr&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

Haas, B. (2018). South Korea's fertility rate set to hit record low of 0.96. The Guardian, September 3
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/03/south-koreas-fertility-rate-set-to-hit-record-low

O'Reilly, B. (2019). China lacks the wherewithal to adjust to demographic decline. Austrian Economics Center
https://www.austriancenter.com/china-lacks-the-wherewithal-to-adjust-to-demographic-decline/

Wang, M. (2018). For Whom the Bell Tolls: A Retrospective and Predictive Study of Fertility Rates in China (November 8, 2018). Available at SSRN: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3234861 

12 comments:

Anonymous said...

To deal with the shrinking workforce, there could be measures to phase out low-paying jobs through automation and robotization. Of course, there must first be a willingness to act. Unfortunately, such willingness is far from evident, to judge by the current denial and inaction.

There is the "Made in China 2025" policy, which has triggered significant backlash from the US. Apparently the policy was designed to deal with a graying and shrinking workforce and to avoid the "middle income trap", and would involve trying to move up the tech and manufacturing value chain and incorporating greater automation and robotization:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_2025#Reactions

The United States think tank Council on Foreign Relations stated in 2018 that it is a "real existential threat to U.S. technological leadership".[15] The Li Keqiang Government maintains that the plan is in line with the country's World Trade Organization obligations.[16] On 15 June 2018, the Trump administration imposed higher tariffs on Chinese goods, escalating the trade tensions between China and the U.S. The tariff list mainly focuses on products included in the Made In China 2025 plan, including IT and robotics related products.[17]

The strategy for China hawks in the US seems to be to try to keep China in the "middle income trap" and have its economy age out.

Anonymous said...

Most Whites in West and Han in China is not kin to one another. Han in North China is more related to Turkic people than Han in South China. Cantonese are more related to Thai and Viet people.

You discounting possibility of mass population shrinking in Europe and China.

OntheSly said...

China has one of the largest diasporas in the world. Their population is estimated at 50 million according to Wikipedia. What percentage of that do you think is likely to return to the motherland for jobs?

OntheSly said...

Also this is timely.

"A government statistics agency that conducted a survey found that in 2018 a slight majority of [South Korea] women felt that marriage was not necessary, while in 2010 a majority felt that it was."

Seems like there's a whole anti-marriage movement over there now which doesn't really have a Western counterpart if true.

https://www.foxnews.com/world/women-in-south-korea-increasingly-rejecting-marriage-motherhood-sparking-declining-birth-rates-and-workforce

Births in Korea this year are down about 7% so far according to Wikipedia.

I wonder what other East Asian nations will realize very low fertility?

Peter Frost said...

Anon,

Yes, the U.S. wants to keep China as a low-wage workshop for the low-end market. This is not a feasible policy unless China opens up to low-wage migrant labor. As for Trump, I suspect this is another case of him outsourcing his thinking to think tanks with questionable agendas.

Anon,

At this point, some population shrinkage is inevitable in both Europe and China. The question is how Europe and China will deal with this problem.

OntheSly,

A large percentage. China already has many immigrants from the overseas Chinese community, and I personally know second and third generation Chinese who have gone to China, usually for a temporary stay (to study or to travel). Then they find a girlfriend or boyfriend there and decide to stay for good.

Very low fertility seems to be happening in those nations that have undergone the most Westernization and urbanization. I predict that TFRs will continue to decline in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore and will reach the level of 0.75 children per woman. Japan may or may not stabilize her TFR. The picture will be somewhat different in Southeast Asia. Thailand is already down to 1.5 children per woman, and we will probably see similar declines in Vietnam and Malaysia. The holdouts will be Cambodia and the Philippines.

Peter Frost said...

Anon,

Yes, the U.S. wants to keep China as a low-wage workshop for the low-end market. This is not a feasible policy unless China opens up to low-wage migrant labor. As for Trump, I suspect this is another case of him outsourcing his thinking to think tanks with questionable agendas.

Anon,

At this point, some population shrinkage is inevitable in both Europe and China. The question is how Europe and China will deal with this problem.

OntheSly,

A large percentage. China already has many immigrants from the overseas Chinese community, and I personally know second and third generation Chinese who have gone to China, usually for a temporary stay (to study or to travel). Then they find a girlfriend or boyfriend there and decide to stay for good.

Very low fertility seems to be happening in those nations that have undergone the most Westernization and urbanization. I predict that TFRs will continue to decline in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore and will reach the level of 0.75 children per woman. Japan may or may not stabilize her TFR. The picture will be somewhat different in Southeast Asia. Thailand is already down to 1.5 children per woman, and we will probably see similar declines in Vietnam and Malaysia. The holdouts will be Cambodia and the Philippines.

Santo said...

You're are confounding kin with race. So, mixed race people no have a kinship instinct/feeling*

Santo said...

China did well imposing laws to reduce fertility rate but it was a remediation to combat the stupidity of uncontrolled demographic explosion, something all [industrially] developed countries had done...

Supposedly, big brainers east asians will create a method to manage the demographic reduction without increasing the risk of extinction, just like land a airplane.

Santo said...

About inuit higher IQ... i don't get anymore that they get comparatively higher IQ due colder climate adaptation in the north american pole, because they are derived from east asian pops, which already had aquired a higher IQ.

Almost Missouri said...

It is hard not to notice that China's astonishing fertility decline from 1967-1977 coincides almost perfectly with China's Cultural Revolution. But this is strange in a way because I don't recall that the Cultural Revolution had any particular objective with regard to fertility. By contrast, China's One Child Policy, which explicitly had a fertility objective, seems to have had no effect at all on fertility.

Godfree Roberts said...

China now has 33 million more males than females?

Not so.

Second–even third–children were never prohibited–second children were encouraged after birth spacing–but third children attracted a fine and did not qualify for social benefits. Though the policy had loopholes–it did not apply to minorities, rural farming families, family with a disabled parent or siblings–children were often not registered at birth and unregistered siblings were mostly girls, thirty-million girls.

Thus was born the myth of the ‘missing girls’ which, like ‘ghost towns,’ captured our imaginations but left American political scientist John Kennedy[1] dissatisfied, “Thirty-million girls are missing from the population–the population of California–and they think they're just gone?” He compared the 2010 census figures with girls’ enrollment and graduation in 2016:

Most people are using a demographic explanation to say that abortion or infanticide are the reasons girls don't show up in the census and that they don't exist, but we find there’s a political explanation. The point of contention is the interaction between the central state's capacity to influence local officials and local officials’ willingness to implement central policies–especially unpopular policies. We find that millions of unreported female births ‘appear’ in older cohorts [school enrollment years], and this also reflects a cultural shift regarding the value of girls in China. The ‘preference for sons’ cultural argument suggests that parents see sons as necessary for elderly care and contributions to family income while daughters are viewed as a burden. However, scholars suggest that over the last few decades, and especially since the introduction of economic reforms, daughters have contributed more to their natal families (i.e., increased their value). Still, the 1990, 2000 and 2010 censuses show that unreported male births are overwhelmingly registered between the ages of one and ten years old but that the vast majority of children registered after the age of ten are females. This implies an administrative bias towards sons whereby they are registered earlier than daughters, rather than a strict son preference (i.e., fewer daughters).

Kennedy interviewed a farmer who introduced his elder daughter and son by name but referred to his middle daughter as ‘the non-existent one’. “He told us that his first daughter was registered but that when his second child, another daughter, was born they did not register her and instead waited to have another child. The third child was a boy and they registered him as the second child.” To keep the peace village officials, often blood relatives, turned a blind eye to children born outside Family Planning limits and left them unreported. Though the government relaxed the rural one-child policy in the 1980s, Kennedy found that village-level enforcement had already bypassed it and thirty-million girls were where they should be, in school.

Today, more girls than boys graduate from university and, when we normalized the data for job position and seniority, gender and wage gaps almost disappear. Modern women keep their surnames after marriage, take International Women's Day off, enjoy up to twelve month maternity leave, a lower retirement age.



[1] Delayed Registration and Identifying the ”Missing Girls” in China. The China Quarterly, Volume 228. December 2016, pp. 1018-1038

Godfree Roberts said...

As China's working population continues to shrink, will the elites push for higher wages so that labor may be used more sparingly?

Erm, Chinese wages have doubled every ten years for the past five decades and are on track to do so this decade.

Chinese manufacturing wages, adjusted for productivity, benefits and PPP, now exceed American manufacturing wages.