A burning car during the 2005 riots. (Wikicommons: Strologoff)
The
gruesome attack on Charlie Hebdo has
earned condemnation around the world. It has been called "cowardly"
and "evil" by Barack Obama, "a barbaric act" by Stephen
Harper, and an "infamy" by François Hollande.
Yes,
violence is serious. It's a crime when done by an individual and war when done
by a country. It's a grave breach of the rules that govern our society.
Whatever differences we may have, they are to be settled peacefully, through
the courts if need be. Violence is just not to be done.
Except
it increasingly is. The attack on Charlie
Hebdo is not an isolated incident. It's part of a worsening trend of violence
by people described as jeunes
[youths] or simply not described at all. That was not the case in the recent
attack; the victims were too well known. But it is generally the case, and this
conspiracy of silence has become something of a social norm, particularly in
the media.
Yet
statistics do exist, notably those compiled by the Gendarmerie. According to
French criminologist Xavier Raufer:
The
criminality we are talking about is the kind that is making life unbearable for
the population: burglaries, thefts of all sorts, assaults, violent thefts
without firearms, etc. In these specific cases, 7 out of 10 of these crimes are
committed by people who in one way or another have an immigrant background,
either directly (first generation on French territory, with or without a residence permit) or
indirectly (second generation). (Chevrier and Raufer, 2014)
The
word "immigrant" is misleading. Many if not most are French-born, and
they tend to come much more from some immigrant groups than from others. In
general, they are young men of North African or sub-Saharan African background,
plus smaller numbers of Roma and Albanians.
This
criminality, when not being denied, is usually put down to social
marginalization and lack of integration. Yet the reverse is closer to the
truth. The typical French person is an individual in a sea of individuals,
whereas immigrant communities enjoy strong social networks and a keen sense
of solidarity. This is one of the reasons given why the targets of the crime
wave are so often Français de souche
[old-stock French]. "Whites don't stick up for each other."
Personal violence
in human societies
In
France, as in other Western countries, personal violence is criminalized and
even pathologized. The young violent male is said to be "sick." Or
"deprived." He has not had a chance to get a good job and lead a nice
quiet life.
Yet
this is not how young violent males perceive themselves or, for that matter,
how most human societies have perceived them down through the ages. Indeed,
early societies accepted the legitimacy of personal violence. Each adult male
had the right to defend himself and his kin with whatever violence he deemed
necessary. The term "self-defence" is used loosely here—a man could
react violently to a lack of respect or to slurs on his honor or the honor of
his ancestors. There were courts to arbitrate this sort of dispute but they
typically had no power, enforcement of court rulings being left to the
aggrieved party and his male kin. In general, violence was a socially approved
way to prove one’s manhood, attract potential mates, and gain respect from
other men.
Things changed as human societies developed. The State grew in power and
increasingly monopolized the legitimate use of violence, thus knocking down the violent
young male from hero to zero. This course of action was zealously pursued in Northwest Europe
from the 11th century onward (Carbasse, 2011, pp. 36-56). There were two
reasons. First, the end of the Dark Ages brought a strengthening of State
power, a resumption of trade and, hence, a growing need and ability by the authorities to pacify
social relations. Second, the main obstacle to criminalization of personal
violence—kin-based morality and the desire to avenge wrongs committed against
kin—seems to have been weaker in Northwest Europe than elsewhere. There was
correspondingly a greater susceptibility to more universal and less kin-based forms of morality,
such as the Christian ban on murder in almost all circumstances.
Murder was increasingly punished not only by the ultimate penalty but also by exemplary
forms of execution, e.g., burning at the stake, drawing and quartering, and breaking on the wheel
(Carbasse, 2011, pp. 52-53). This "war on murder" reached a peak from
the 16th to 18th centuries when, out of every two hundred men, one or two would
end up being executed (Taccoen, 1982, p. 52). A comparable number of murderers
would die either at the scene of the crime or in prison while awaiting trial
(Ireland, 1987).
Gene-culture
co-evolution?
The
cultural norm thus shifted toward nonviolence. There was now strong selection
against people who could not or would not lead peaceful lives, their removal
from society being abrupt, via the hangman's noose, or more gradual, through
ostracism by one's peers and rejection on the marriage market. As a result, the
homicide rate fell from between 20 and 40 homicides per 100,000 in the late
Middle Ages to between 0.5 and 1 per 100,000 in the mid-20th century (Eisner,
2001, pp. 628-629).
Was
this decline due solely to legal and cultural restraints on personal violence?
Or were there also changes to the gene pool? Was there a process of
gene-culture co-evolution whereby Church and State created a culture of
nonviolence, which in turn favored some genotypes over others? We know that
aggressive/antisocial behavior is moderately to highly heritable. In the latest
twin study, heritability was 40% when the twins had different evaluators and
69% when they had the same one (Barker et al., 2009). The actual neural basis
is still unsure. Perhaps a predisposition to violence is due to stronger
impulsiveness and weaker internal controls on behavior (Niv et al., 2012).
Perhaps the threshold for expression of violence is lower. Perhaps ideation
comes easier (van der Dennen, 2006). Or perhaps the sight and smell of blood is
more pleasurable (vanden Bergh and Kelly, 1964).
It was probably a mix of cultural and genetic factors that caused the homicide rate to decline in Western societies. Even if culture alone were responsible,
we would still be facing the same problem. Different societies view male
violence differently:
In
Algerian society for example, children are raised according to their sex. A boy
usually receives an authoritarian and severe type of upbringing that will
prepare him to become aware of the responsibilities that await him in
adulthood, notably responsibility for his family and for the elderly. This is
why a mother will allow her son to fight in the street and will scarcely be
alarmed if the boy has a fall or if she sees a bruise. The boy of an Algerian
family is accustomed from an early age to being hit hard without whimpering too
much. People orient him more toward combat sports and group games in order to
arm him with courage and endurance—virtues deemed to be manly. (Assous, 2005)
In
Algeria and similar societies, a shaky equilibrium contains the worst
excesses of male violence. Men think twice before acting violently, for fear
of retaliation from the victim's brothers and other kinsmen. Of course, this
"balance of terror" does not deter violence against those who have
few kinsmen to count on.
Problems
really begin, however, when a culture that legitimizes male violence coexists
with one that delegitimizes it. This is France’s situation. Les jeunes perceive violence as a
legitimate way to advance personal interests, and they eagerly pursue this goal
with other young men. Conversely, les
Français de souche perceive such violence as illegitimate and will not
organize collectively for self-defence. The outcome is predictable. The first
group will focus their attacks on members of the second group—not out of hate
but because the latter are soft targets who cannot fight back or get support
from others.
But
what about the obviously Islamist motives of the Charlie Hebdo attackers? Such motives can certainly channel violent
tendencies, but those tendencies would exist regardless. Even if we completely
eradicated radical Islam, les jeunes
would still be present and still engaging in the same kind of behavior that is
becoming almost routine. At best, there would be fewer high-profile
attacks—the kind that make the police pull out all stops to find and kill the
perps. It is this "high end" that attracts the extremists, since they
are the least deterred by the risks incurred. The “low end” tends to attract
devotees of American hip hop. Keep in mind that less than two-thirds of
France's Afro/Arab/Roma population is even nominally Muslim.
Conclusion
Modern
France is founded on Western principles of equality, human betterment, and
universal morality. Anyone anywhere can become French. That view, the official one,
seems more and more disconnected from reality. Many people living in France
have no wish to become French in any meaningful sense. By "French" I
don't mean having a passport, paying taxes, or agreeing to a set of abstract
propositions. I mean behaving in certain concrete ways and sharing a common
culture and history.
This
reality is sinking in, and with it a loss of faith in the official view of
France. Faith can be restored, on the condition that outrageous incidents stop
happening. But they will continue to happen. And they will matter a lot more
than the much more numerous incidents tout court—the rising tide of thefts,
assaults, and home invasions that are spreading deeper and deeper into areas
that were safe a few years ago. The attack on Charlie Hebdo matters more because it cannot be hidden from public
view and public acknowledgment. How does one explain the disappearance of an
entire newspaper and the mass execution of its editorial board?
The
Front national will be the beneficiary, of course. It may already have one
third of the electorate, but that's still not enough to take power, especially
with all of the other parties from the right to the left combining to keep the
FN out. Meanwhile, the Great Replacement proceeds apace, regardless of whether
the government is "left-wing" or "right-wing."
References
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http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/156920805774910033
Barker,
E.D., H. Larsson, E. Viding, B. Maughan, F. Rijsdijk, N. Fontaine, and R.
Plomin. (2009). Common genetic but specific environmental influences for
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