In the Reign of
Terror,
by Jessie Macgregor (1891). We don’t respond equally to signs of emotional
distress in other people (Wikicommons)
We
like to think that all people feel empathy to the same degree. In reality, it varies
a lot from one person to the next, like most mental traits. We are half-aware
of this when we distinguish between "normal people" and
"psychopaths," the latter having an abnormally low capacity for
empathy. The distinction is arbitrary, like the one between "tall"
and "short." As with stature, empathy varies continuously among the
individuals of a population, with psychopaths being the ones we find beyond an
arbitrary cut-off point and who probably have many other things wrong with them.
By focusing on the normal/abnormal dichotomy, we lose sight of the variation
that occurs among so-called normal individuals. We probably meet people every
day who have a low capacity for empathy and who nonetheless look and act normal. Because
they seem normal, we assume they are as empathetic as we are. They aren’t.
Like
most mental traits, empathy is heritable, its heritability being estimated at
68% (Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen, 2013). It has two distinct components:
cognitive empathy and affective empathy. Some researchers identify a third
component, pro-social behavior, but its relationship to the other two seems
tangential.
Cognitive
empathy appears to be the evolutionarily older component of the two. It is the
capacity to understand how another person is feeling and then predict how
different actions will affect that person’s emotional state. But this capacity
can be used for selfish purposes. Examples are legion: the con artist; many
telemarketers; the rapist who knows how to charm his victims ...
Affective
empathy is the younger component, having developed out of cognitive empathy. It
is the capacity not just to understand another person's emotional state but
also to identify with it. A person with high affective empathy will try to help
someone in distress not because such help is personally advantageous or legally
required, but because he or she is actually feeling the same distress.
Affective
empathy may have initially evolved as a means to facilitate relations between a
mother and her children. Later, and to varying degrees, it became extended to
other human relationships. This evolutionary trajectory is perceptible in young
children:
Children
do not display empathic concern toward all people equally. Instead, they show
bias toward individuals and members of groups with which they identify. For
instance, young children of 2 years of age display more concern-related
behaviors toward their mother than toward unfamiliar people. Moreover, children
(aged 3-9 years) view social categories as marking patterns of interpersonal
obligations. They view people as responsible only to their own group members,
and consider within-group harm as wrong regardless of explicit rules, but they
view the wrongness of between-group harm as contingent on the presence of such
rules. (Decety and Cowell, 2014)
Similarly,
MRI studies show that adults are much more likely to experience emotional
distress when they see loved ones in pain than when they see strangers in pain.
A stranger in distress will evoke a response only to the degree that the observer
has a high capacity for affective empathy. The higher the capacity the more it will
encompass not only loved ones but also less related individuals, including
total strangers and nonhumans:
Humans
can feel empathic concern for a wide range of 'others', including for nonhuman
animals, such as pets (in the Western culture) or tamagotchi (in Japan). This
is especially the case when signs of vulnerability and need are noticeable. In
support of this, neural regions involved in perceiving the distress of other
humans, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and insula, are similarly activated
when witnessing the distress of domesticated animals (Decety and Cowell, 2014)
While
we associate affective empathy with morality, the two are not the same, and
there are situations where the two come into conflict. In most societies,
kinship is the main organizing principle of social relations, and morality affirms
this principle by spelling out the duties to one's parents, one's kin, and
one's ethny. The importance of kinship may be seen in the Ten Commandments,
which we wrongfully assume to be universal in application. We are told we must
not kill, steal, lie, or commit adultery if the victims are "thy
neighbor," which is explained as meaning "the children of thy
people" (Leviticus 19:18). High-empathy
individuals may thus subvert morality if they view all human distress as being
equal in value. At best, they will neglect loved ones in order to help an
indefinitely large number of needy strangers. At worst, strangers may develop
strategies to exploit high-empathy individuals, i.e., to milk them for all they
are worth.
Mapping empathy in
the human brain
Empathy
appears to arise from specific mechanisms in the brain, and not from a more
general property, like general intelligence. It is produced by a sequence of
mental events, beginning with "mirror neurons" that fire in tandem with
the observed behavior of another person, thereby generating a mental model of
this behavior. Copies of the model are sent elsewhere in the brain to decode
the nature and purpose of the behavior and to predict the sensory consequences
for the observed person. Affective empathy goes further by feeding these
predicted consequences into the observer's emotional state (Carr et al., 2003).
Recent
MRI research has confirmed that empathy is associated with increased
development of certain regions within the brain. Individuals who score high on
cognitive empathy have denser gray matter in the midcingulate cortex and the
adjacent dorsomedial prefontal cortex, whereas individuals who score high on
affective empathy have denser gray matter in the insula cortex (Eres et al.,2015). A high capacity for affective empathy is also associated with a larger
amygdala, which seems to control the way we respond to facial expressions of
fear and other signs of emotional distress (Marsh et al., 2014).
Can
these brain regions be used to measure our capacity for affective empathy? Two
studies, one American and one English, have found that
"conservatives" tend to have a larger right amygdala (Kanai et al.,2011; Schreiber et al., 2013). This has been spun, perhaps predictably, as
proof that the political right is fear-driven (Hibbing et al., 2014). A
likelier explanation is that "conservatives" are disproportionately
drawn from populations that have, on average, a higher capacity for affective
empathy.
Do human
populations vary in their capacity for affective empathy?
Is
it possible, then, that this capacity varies among human populations, just as
it varies among individuals? I have argued that affective empathy is more
adaptive in larger, more complex societies where kinship obligations can no
longer restrain behavior that seriously interferes with the ability of
individuals to live together peacefully and constructively (Frost, 2015).
Whereas affective empathy was originally expressed mainly between a mother and
her children, it has become progressively extended in some populations to a wider
range of interactions. This evolutionary change may be compared to the capacity
to digest milk sugar: initially, this capacity was limited to early childhood,
but in dairy cattle cultures it has become extended into adulthood.
I
have also argued that this evolutionary change has gone the farthest in
Europeans north and west of the Hajnal Line (Frost, 2014a). In these populations,
kinship has been a weaker force in organizing social relations, at least since
the early Middle Ages and perhaps since prehistoric times. There has thus been
selection for mechanisms, like affective empathy, that can regulate social
interaction between unrelated individuals. This selection may have intensified
during two time periods:
-
An initial period corresponding to the emergence of complex
hunter/fisher/gatherers during the Mesolithic along the shores of the North Sea
and the Baltic. Unlike other hunter-gatherers, who were typically small bands
of individuals, these people were able to form large coastal communities by
exploiting abundant marine resources. Such communities were beset, however, by the
problem of enforcing rule compliance on unrelated people, the result being
strong selection for rule-compliant individuals who share certain
predispositions, namely affective empathy, proneness to guilt, and willingness
to obey moral rules and to expel anyone who does not (Frost, 2013a; Frost, 2013b).
-
A second period corresponding to the spread of Christianity among Northwest
Europeans, particularly with the outbreeding, population growth, and increase
in manorialism that followed the Dark Ages (hbd chick, 2014). The result was a
"fruitful encounter" between the two: on the one hand, Christianity,
with its emphasis on internalized morality, struck a responsive chord in these
populations; on the other hand, the latter modified Christianity, increasing
its emphasis on faith, compassion, and original sin (Frost, 2014b).
Conclusion
Recent
research has brought much insight into the nature of empathy, which should no longer
be viewed as being simply a noble precept. We now understand it as the outcome
of a sequence of events in specific regions of the brain. We have also learned
that individuals vary in their capacity for empathy and that most of this
variability is heritable, as is the case with most mental traits. Moreover,
empathy has two components—cognitive and affective—and the strength of one in
relation to the other likewise varies. Although we often consider affective
empathy to be desirable, it can have perverse and even
pathological effects in some contexts.
References
Carr, L., M. Iacoboni, M-C. Dubeau, J.C.
Mazziotta, and G.L. Lenzi. (2003). Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: A
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Chakrabarti,
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