Showing posts with label Augustine Kong. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Augustine Kong. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 14, 2022

The Great Decline

 


Mean polygenic score of Icelanders by year of birth (Kong et al. 2017, Fig. 2)

 

Three polygenic studies have shown that cognitive ability declined among European Americans, British people, and Icelanders during the 20th century. The decline briefly stopped during the postwar baby boom and again with the liberalization of abortion laws.

 

 

How can we measure the genetic component of cognitive ability? For a long time, the only way was to administer an IQ test, but the result would inevitably be influenced by the test-taker’s environment—not only culture and life history but also familiarity with taking tests and answering questions in rapid-fire succession. Yes, twin studies and adoption studies suggest that genetic factors largely explain variation in IQ between individuals. But the same is not necessarily true for variation in IQ between populations. That could be 100% environmental.

 

Recent years have seen the advent of a direct measure of innate cognitive ability: the educational attainment polygenic score. It’s a summation of the predicted effects of genetic variants that together explain 11-13% of the variance in educational attainment among individuals (Lee et al. 2018). It’s especially suited for predicting the mean IQ of a population—the correlation is 98% with the actual mean IQ (Piffer 2019).  Polygenic data predict a mean IQ of about 85 for sub-Saharan Africans, 100 for Europeans, and 105 for East Asians. There is also variation within each of those geographic groups. Among Europeans, predicted IQ varies from 97 for southern Europeans to 102 for Finns and 110 for Ashkenazi Jews. Among sub-Saharan Africans, it seems to be higher among groups who were more advanced during precolonial times, particularly those, like the Igbo, who lived along the Niger and took part in trade between the coast and the interior (Frost 2022).

 

The above predictions should be viewed with some caution. Because the genetic variants have been identified only in people of European descent, the polygenic score is less valid for non-Europeans, particularly those of sub-Saharan African descent. It thus predicts the IQ of African Americans with five times less accuracy than that of European Americans (Lasker et al. 2019).

 

Generational change

 

In addition to predicting differences in mean IQ across space, we can do the same across time. That begs the question: were past generations as intelligent as the latest one? We can answer that question by examining past generations who are still alive. That approach, however, raises the issue of survivorship bias: people who live to an old age are generally smarter than those who do not (Gottfredson and Deary 2004).

 

Beauchamp (2016) deals with this issue point by point when he discusses polygenic data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal study of 20,000 Americans shortly before and during retirement:

 

·         The HRS participants are people who have lived to the age of 50; however, about 10% of American women and 15% of American men born in 1940 were already dead by the age of 50.

·         Thus, in Beauchamp’s sample, 85% of the original participants were still alive in 2008, 69% were asked to be genotyped, and 59% consented to be genotyped.

·         Nonetheless, no important differences emerged when he compared the genotyped participants with the total sample. 

 

European Americans

 

Beauchamp found evidence that alleles associated with high educational attainment had declined in frequency among European Americans between the 1931 and 1953 birth cohorts. “[M]y results strongly suggest that genetic variants associated with EA have slowly been selected against among both female and male Americans of European ancestry born between 1931 and 1953.”

 

That decline is attributed to differences in fertility: “individuals with high EA typically have children at a more advanced age, which may further reduce their fitness.”

 

Icelanders

 

The above findings have been replicated by Kong et al. (2017) in their study of Icelanders born since 1910. Although survivorship bias is still a problem, it does not easily explain the decline in cognitive ability between the last two cohorts, i.e., Icelanders born in the 1970s and those born in the 1980s. In that decline, any survivorship bias would be due to deaths of people less than 44 years old, and in most cases less than 36 years old. “The samples studied here were collected between 1998 and 2014, with a majority (68%) ascertained before 2006” (Kong et al, 2017, p. E729).

 

Iceland’s cognitive decline had two “pauses”: one in the 1950s and another in the 1970s. The first pause coincides with the postwar economic boom and a corresponding improvement in the ability of middle class couples to start families early in life. The second pause may reflect the passage in 1975 of Iceland’s abortion law, which, while not allowing abortion on demand, did allow it for cases of rape, mental disability of the mother, and “difficult family situation” (Wikipedia 2022)

 

Kong et al. (2017) concluded that the cognitive decline was due only in part to more intelligent Icelanders staying in school longer and postponing reproduction. In fact, a high educational level, unlike a high polygenic score, was actually associated with somewhat higher fertility among males. A high polygenic score seems to reduce fertility independently of whether one pursues or does not pursue higher education, perhaps because higher intelligence goes hand in hand with greater ability to plan ahead and thus foresee, with trepidation, the costs of raising a family. 

 

British of European descent

 

In a study of British of European origin, using the UK Biobank, Hugh-Jones and Abdellaoui. (2022) found that mean cognitive ability had declined between two successive generations, particularly in lower-income groups. The median birth year was 1950 for the second generation and unknown for the first. The authors also looked at genetic variants that influence non-cognitive traits. In general, the bulk of the population seems to be getting dumber, fatter, and nuttier.

 

The authors nonetheless warn against excessive pessimism:

 

Many people would probably prefer to have high educational attainment, a low risk of ADHD and major depressive disorder, and a low risk of coronary artery disease, but natural selection is pushing against genes associated with these traits. Potentially, this could increase the health burden on modern populations, but that depends on effect sizes.

 

The authors go on to argue that the effect sizes are “small,” although one wonders: smaller than what? They then make the obvious point that generational change can accumulate from one generation to the next: “Although effects on our measured polygenic scores are small even after weighting, individually small disadvantages can cumulate to create larger effects” (Hugh-Jones and Abdellaoui 2022). Beauchamp (2016) makes a similar comment that seems reassuring on first thought, and then not so reassuring on second thought: “natural selection has thus been occurring in that population—albeit at a rate that pales in comparison with the rapid changes that have occurred in recent generations.”

 

Finally, Hugh-Jones and Abdellaoui (2022) point out that their data may suffer from ascertainment bias. For instance, the first generation of their dataset is composed of the parents of the second generation. The dataset thus excludes the childless individuals of the first generation. Were they more intelligent or less intelligent on average than the succeeding generation? Furthermore, participation in the UK Biobank is voluntary. Could that factor also be a source of bias? If so, in what direction?

 

Conclusion

 

As time goes by, intergenerational genetic datasets will become more complete, and the problem of survivorship bias will diminish. Ideally, we should conduct a “genetic census” of each generation, perhaps by collecting a DNA sample from everyone at the time of death. We will thus be able to see how we are evolving.

 

We now have intergenerational polygenic studies from three different Western countries: the U.S., the U.K., and Iceland. In all three cases, the genetic component of cognitive ability declined during the 20th century, with the exception of two pauses: one during the postwar baby boom and the other with the liberalization of access to abortion.

 

If we wish to halt the cognitive decline, we should push for the following measures:

 

·         A return to the protected high-wage economy that prevailed during the postwar era;

·         Free access to abortion, at least for cases of rape, mental disability of either parent, and difficult economic circumstances;

·         Pro-natalist measures to counteract the fear of not having the means to support a family. This fear is particularly strong among people who like to plan and are oriented toward the future.

 

 

References

 

Beauchamp, J.P. (2016). Genetic evidence for natural selection in humans in the contemporary United States. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(28): 7774-7779. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1600398113    

 

Frost, P. (2022). Recent cognitive evolution in West Africa: the Niger’s role. Evo and Proud, April 30. https://evoandproud.blogspot.com/2022/04/recent-cognitive-evolution-in-west.html  

 

Gottfredson, L. S., and I.J. Deary. (2004). Intelligence Predicts Health and Longevity, but Why? Current Directions in Psychological Science 13(1): 1–4. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01301001.x

 

Hugh-Jones, D., and A. Abdellaoui. (2022). Human Capital Mediates Natural Selection in Contemporary Humans. Behavior Genetics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10519-022-10107-w  

 

Kong, A., M.L. Frigge, G. Thorleifsson, H. Stefansson, A.I. Young, F. Zink, G.A. Jonsdottir, A. Okbay, P. Sulem, G. Masson, D.F. Gudbjartsson, A. Helgason, G. Bjornsdottir, U. Thorsteinsdottir, and K. Stefansson. (2017). Selection against variants in the genome associated with educational attainment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(5): E727-E732. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1612113114   

 

Lasker, J., B.J. Pesta, J.G.R. Fuerst, and E.O.W. Kirkegaard. (2019). Global ancestry and cognitive ability. Psych 1(1). https://doi.org/10.3390/psych1010034    

 

Lee, J. J., Wedow, R., Okbay, A., Kong, E., Maghzian, O., Zacher, et al. (2018). Gene discovery and polygenic prediction from a genome-wide association study of educational attainment in 1.1 million individuals. Nature Genetics 50(8): 1112-1121. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41588-018-0147-3  

 

Piffer, D. (2019). Evidence for Recent Polygenic Selection on Educational Attainment and Intelligence Inferred from Gwas Hits: A Replication of Previous Findings Using Recent Data. Psych 1(1): 55-75. https://www.mdpi.com/2624-8611/1/1/5   

 

Wikipedia (2022). Abortion in Iceland. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abortion_in_Iceland    

 

Monday, August 29, 2022

How real is the Flynn effect?

 

Changes in mean IQ between 1909 and 2013 (Pietschnig and Voracek 2015, p. 285)

 

 

Because of the Flynn effect, average IQ has risen by 35 points over the past century. That’s more than the difference between the threshold of mental retardation and the current average. Does that seem plausible?



 

In a 1984 paper, James Flynn showed that the mean IQ of White Americans rose by 13.8 points between 1932 and 1978 (Flynn 1984). When that increase, now called the Flynn effect, was charted between 1920 and 2013, the gain in IQ was found to be no less than 35 points (Pietschnig and Voracek 2015).

 

The IQ gain did not happen at a uniform rate. It can be broken down into five stages:

 

·         a small increase between 1909 and 1919 (0.80 points/decade)

·         a surge during the 1920s and early 1930s (7.2 points/decade)

·         a slower pace of growth between 1935 and 1947 (2.1 points/decade)

·         a faster one between 1948 and 1976 (3.0 points/decade)

·         a slower pace thereafter (2.3 points/decade)

 

The Flynn effect began in the core of the Western world and is now ending there. In fact, it has ended altogether in Norway and Sweden and has begun to reverse itself in Denmark and Finland (Pietschnig and Voracek 2015, pp. 283, 288-289).

 

Was it a real increase?

 

Average IQ has thus risen by 35 points over the past century. That’s more than the difference between the threshold of mental retardation and the current average. Does that seem plausible?

 

My mother went to high school during the 1930s, and I went during the 1970s. So my generation should be 13.8 points smarter than hers. That’s a big difference, and it should have been obvious to someone like myself who knew people from both generations.

 

It wasn’t obvious. My mother had a small library of books that she often consulted, mostly religious literature and works like Welcome Wilderness and Little Dorrit. Not all of her generation were obsessive readers, but many were. And the books they read weren’t light reading. Fiction typically had complex plots with subplots running alongside each other, and religious books were a maze of Biblical references that would seem obscure unless you knew the Bible, usually the King James Version. If you could handle that, you could handle string theory.

 

The Flynn effect also implies that post-millennials are 10 points smarter than my generation. Again, that’s not my impression. Books and movies now have simpler plots and use a smaller vocabulary—a key component of verbal intelligence. According to the General Social Survey, vocabulary test scores fell by 7.2% between the mid-1970s and the 2010s among non-Hispanic White Americans. The decline affected all levels of educational attainment, so it wasn’t just a matter of dumber people now going to college (Frost 2019; Twenge et al. 2019). The same period also saw an increase in reaction time: since the 1970s, successive birth cohorts have required more time, on average, to process the same information (Madison 2014; Madison et al. 2016). 

 

Finally, there is the genetic evidence, specifically alleles associated with high educational attainment. In Iceland, those alleles have become steadily fewer in cohorts born since 1910 (Kong et al. 2017). The same trend has been observed between the 1931 and 1953 birth cohorts of European Americans (Beauchamp 2016). According to the Icelandic study, the downward trend is happening partly because more intelligent Icelanders are staying in school longer and postponing reproduction. But it is also happening among those who do not pursue higher education. Modern culture seems to be telling people that children are costly and bothersome, and that message is most convincing to people who like to plan ahead.

 

Some writers have argued that the genetic decline in intellectual potential has been more than offset by improvements to our learning environment, particularly better and longer education. This improved environment is helping us do more with our intellectual potential. But is there real-world evidence that we are, on average, becoming smarter? Robert Howard (1999, 2001, 2005) cites four lines of evidence:

 

·        The prevalence of mild mental retardation has fallen in the US population and elsewhere.

·        Chess players are reaching top performance at earlier ages.

·        More journal articles and patents are coming out each year.

·        According to high school teachers who have taught for over 20 years, “most reported perceiving that average general intelligence, ability to do school work, and literacy skills of school children had not risen since 1979 but most believed that children's practical ability had increased” (Howard 2001).

 

The above evidence is debatable, as Howard himself acknowledges. Fewer children are being diagnosed as mental retarded because that term has become stigmatized. Prenatal screening has also had an impact. As for chess, it’s a niche activity that tells us little about the general population. More journal articles are indeed being published each year, but the reason has more to do with pressure to “publish or perish.” Finally, teachers are not objective observers: they are part of a system that rewards certain views and penalizes others. And if they reject that system, they probably won’t stick around for more than twenty years.

 

A last word

 

I suspect we’re getting better at some cognitive tasks, particularly the ones we learn at school—if only because we’re spending more of our lifetime in the classroom. One of those tasks is sitting down at a desk and taking a test. We’re better not only at that specific task but also at the broader one of thinking in terms of questions and answers. Previously, we just learned the rules and imitated those who knew better than us.

 

Test-taking certainly made an impression on my mental development. Long after my undergrad studies I would have nightmares of sitting alone in an immense exam hall and not knowing the answer to an insoluble question.

 

References

 

Beauchamp, J.P. (2016). Genetic evidence for natural selection in humans in the contemporary United States. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 113(28): 7774-7779. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1600398113  

 

Flynn, J.R. (1984). The mean IQ of Americans: Massive gains 1932–1978. Psychological Bulletin 95(1):29–51. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0033-2909.95.1.29   

 

Frost, P. (2019). Why is vocabulary shrinking? Evo and Proud, September 11. https://evoandproud.blogspot.com/2019/09/why-is-vocabulary-shrinking.html

 

Frost, P. (2020). From here it’s all downhill. Evo and Proud, March 16. https://evoandproud.blogspot.com/2020/03/from-here-its-all-downhill.html

 

Howard, R. W. (1999). Preliminary real-world evidence that average human intelligence really is rising. Intelligence 27: 235–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-2896(99)00018-5  

 

Howard, R. W. (2001). Searching the real world for signs of rising population intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences 30: 1039–1058. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00095-7

 

Howard, R. W. (2005). Objective evidence of rising population ability: A detailed examination of longitudinal chess data. Personality and Individual Differences, 38(2), 347–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.04.013

 

Kong, A., M.L. Frigge, G. Thorleifsson, H. Stefansson, A.I. Young, F. Zink, G.A. Jonsdottir, A. Okbay, P. Sulem, G. Masson, D.F. Gudbjartsson, A. Helgason, G. Bjornsdottir, U. Thorsteinsdottir, and K. Stefansson. (2017). Selection against variants in the genome associated with educational attainment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(5): E727-E732.  https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1612113114

 

Madison, G. (2014). Increasing simple reaction times demonstrate decreasing genetic intelligence in Scotland and Sweden, London Conference on Intelligence. Psychological comments, April 25 #LCI14 Conference proceedings. http://www.unz.com/jthompson/lci14-questions-on-intelligence/    

 

Madison, G., M.A. Woodley of Menie, and J. Sänger. (2016). Secular Slowing of Auditory Simple Reaction Time in Sweden (1959-1985). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, August 18. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00407

 

Pietschnig, J., and M. Voracek. (2015). One Century of Global IQ Gains: A Formal Meta-Analysis of the Flynn Effect (1909-2013). Perspectives on Psychological Science 10(3): 282-306. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691615577701

 

Twenge, J.M., W.K. Campbell, and R.A. Sherman. (2019). Declines in vocabulary among American adults within levels of educational attainment, 1974-2016. Intelligence 76: 101377. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2019.101377

Monday, March 16, 2020

From here it's all downhill





Polish IQ scores for three subtests: Similarities, Vocabulary, and Arithmetic (Wikicommons - Pedros)

Throughout the West the Flynn effect is coming to an end. More and more people are bumping up against a ceiling that is getting lower and lower.



The Flynn effect is ending throughout the West. After a century of steady increase, average IQ scores are levelling off and even starting to fall in Scandinavia, England, and Austria (Dutton 2016; Flynn 2007, p. 143; Rindermann 2018, pp. 85-88; Teasdale and Owen 2005). 

But how real was that increase anyway? Read the popular literature from a hundred years ago. Look at the size of the vocabulary and the complexity of the plots. Also look at what people had to know when graduating from elementary school. IQ scores increased during the 20th century largely because people became more familiar with taking standardized tests and thinking in terms of standardized answers to standardized questions. They had no choice. This was a time when people were staying increasingly longer in school. As higher education became the rule for everyone—first high school and then college and university—good grades became the goal for everyone, and not just for a small elite. 

So the average phenotype has been pushed to the limit by compulsory secondary education and by social pressure to pursue tertiary education. Meanwhile, the average genotype has been trending in another direction. 

- Reaction time has lengthened, i.e., people are taking longer on average to process the same information. In Great Britain, mean reaction time has risen by 13 points since the Victorian era (Woodley et al. 2013). This finding may be due to better sampling of the general population over time (hbd*chick 2013); however, a Swedish study found the same lengthening of reaction time, particularly in cohorts born since the 1970s (Madison 2014; Madison et al. 2016). 

- The genetic basis for intelligence has declined, as shown by a progressive decline in the "polygenic score" of alleles associated with educational attainment. In Iceland, this score has fallen since the cohort born in 1910 (Kong et al. 2017). Among Euro Americans, it fell between the 1931 and 1953 birth cohorts (Beauchamp 2016).

In sum, the average phenotype and the average genotype have been moving in opposite directions. This point is made by Hong (2020):

In general, more educated women delay the onset of childbearing and have fewer children overall compared to less educated women. This pattern is very robust in both developed and developing countries, and various theories have been proposed to explicate the intrinsic, potentially causal relationship between education level and fertility.

[...] The phenotype of EA [educational attainment], on the other hand, may experience a very different type of selective pressure. A large literature in sociology shows that educational attainment and socio-economic status are associated, and cultural evolutionary theory predicts that humans readily copy the behaviors of those who are perceived as more prestigious or successful. Although educational attainment cannot be "copied" in a literal sense, individuals who pick models with high EA are likely to be more motivated in learning and committed to their academic studies, and as a result become more likely to obtain higher EA themselves. Thus, genetic fitness and cultural fitness of the same trait (EA) invites selection in opposite directions [...].

As long as the genetic decline is offset by better and longer education, there is nothing to worry about. We may be learning more slowly, but we're spending more time learning. As Courtiol et al. (2016) argue: "the jockey has become more skilled as the power of the horse dwindles."


What if the horse collapses?

Unfortunately, this situation cannot go on forever. The phenotype (“jockey”) and the genotype (“horse”) are not independent entities; in fact, the former is developed within the limits of the latter. As the upper limit gets lower and lower, more and more of us will be bumping up against that ceiling. In other words, "at some point genetics will become the limiting factor in determining the phenotype of EA, which may eventually decline as a result of natural selection" (Hong 2020).

That point seems to be ... about now. In the West, the Flynn effect has exhausted itself, having used up the wiggle room of education. From here it's all downhill.  As Dutton et al. (2016) note in their review of the literature:

Eventually, the ceiling of this ability would be reached and the losses would start to reveal themselves on IQ tests. In addition, Woodley and Fernandes (2016) have shown that the Flynn Effect is not primarily occurring on general and heritable intelligence factor g, whereas the negative Flynn Effect does seem to occur on g. The negative Flynn Effect displays a Jensen Effect, and is mainly occurring on the more heritable abilities.


References

Beauchamp, J.P. (2016). Genetic evidence for natural selection in humans in the contemporary United States. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 113(28): 7774-7779.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4948342/

Courtiol, A., F.C. Tropf, and M.C. Mills. (2016). When genes and environment disagree: Making sense of trends in recent human evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(28): 7693-7695.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4948334/

Dutton, E., D. van der Linden, and R. Lynn. (2016). The negative Flynn Effect: A systematic literature review. Intelligence 59: 163-169.
https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2016-dutton.pdf

Flynn, J.R. (2007). What is Intelligence? Beyond the Flynn Effect. Cambridge University Press.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=qvBipuypYUkC&printsec=frontcover&hl=fr&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hbd*chick (2013). A response to a response to two critical commentaries on woodley, te nijenhuis and murphy. May 27
http://hbdchick.wordpress.com/2013/05/27/a-response-to-a-response-to-two-critical-commentaries-on-woodley-te-nijenhuis-murphy-2013/

Hong, Z. (2020). Modelling the on-going natural selection of educational attainment in contemporary societies. Journal of Theoretical Biology 493: 110210
https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/605311v2.full

Kong, A., M.L. Frigge, G. Thorleifsson, H. Stefansson, A.I. Young, F. Zink, G.A. Jonsdottir, A. Okbay, P. Sulem, G. Masson, D.F. Gudbjartsson, A. Helgason, G. Bjornsdottir, U. Thorsteinsdottir, and K. Stefansson. (2017). Selection against variants in the genome associated with educational attainment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(5): E727-E732.

Madison, G. (2014). Increasing simple reaction times demonstrate decreasing genetic intelligence in Scotland and Sweden, London Conference on Intelligence. Psychological comments, April 25
#LCI14 Conference proceedings
http://www.unz.com/jthompson/lci14-questions-on-intelligence/   

Madison, G., M.A. Woodley of Menie, and J. Sänger. (2016). Secular Slowing of Auditory Simple Reaction Time in Sweden (1959-1985). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, August 18
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00407/full  

Rindermann, H. (2018). Cognitive Capitalism. Human Capital and the Wellbeing of Nations. Cambridge University Press.

Teasdale, T.W., and D.R. Owen. (2005). A long-term rise and recent decline in intelligence test performance: The Flynn Effect in reverse. Personality and Individual Differences 39(4): 837-843.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.01.029   

Woodley of Menie, M.A., and H.B.F. Fernandes. (2016). Showing their true colours: Possible secular declines and a Jensen effect on colour acuity — More evidence for the weaker variant of Spearman's Other Hypothesis. Personality and Individual Differences 88: 280-284.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0191886915005826

Woodley, M.A., J. Nijenhuis, and R. Murphy. (2013). Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time. Intelligence 41: 843-850. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e8cc/634169c7c5d3e4738fe08091c86177be1380.pdf

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Yes, the decline is genetic


Average polygenic score for educational attainment, by year of birth in Iceland. The blue line is a quadratic fit for the full range of birth years. The red line is a linear fit for people born in or after 1940. (Kong et al. 2017)



For most of the 20th century mean IQ went up at the rate of 3 points per decade throughout the Western world. This is the Flynn effect (Rindermann 2018, pp. 85-89). Much of the increase seems to have involved a change in mental priorities rather than a rise in intelligence: a culture of doing as we're told has given way to a culture of having several possible responses and picking the right one. But some of the increase seems real, being perhaps due to better nutrition and a more stimulating learning environment.

The Flynn effect is now running out of steam (Flynn 2007, p. 143). In Scandinavia, mean IQ peaked during the late 1990s and has since declined (Teasdale and Owen 2005). Using the Norwegian population registry, two economists, Bernt Bratsberg and Ole Rogeberg, attribute this decline largely, if not entirely, to "within-family variation." In other words, IQ has been declining even among people of similar genetic background, i.e., siblings. So this decline is not due to the poor outbreeding the rich or immigrants outbreeding natives.

All the same, a genetic cause cannot be excluded. In Norway, siblings are less and less genetically similar; they are increasingly half-siblings. This factor can especially affect the methodology of Bratsberg and Rogeberg (2018) because the IQ decline is most measurable between siblings who are born farther apart. As this birth interval increases, so does the probability that the younger siblings is a half-sibling.

This is not a minor factor. Bratsberg and Rogeberg were looking at pairs of brothers. (The IQ data come from the military conscript register, and only men are subject to conscription). To produce a pair of brothers, a woman has to have three children on average. Among Norwegian women with three children, 36.2% have had them by two or more men (Thomson et al. 2014). Furthermore, because those children tend to be born farther apart than children born to the same father, they contribute more to within-family variation.

If the genetic basis of intelligence has been declining within Norwegian families, specifically between older and younger half-siblings, two things must be happening:

1. The average divorced mother has her second child by a man who belongs to a lower-IQ segment of the Norwegian population.

2. Such men have been contributing more than other men to succeeding generations of Norwegians, at least during the last forty years. This point is important. Even if we look only at first-born sons, mean IQ has steadily declined among Norwegians born since c. 1975 (Bratsberg and Rogeberg 2018).

The first point has been proven by LappegÃ¥rd et al. 2011) in their study of fatherhood and fertility in Norway. Multi-partner fatherhood is most common among men with the lowest level of education (10 years of schooling, "i.e., compulsory education"). Second place goes to men with college or university education (14 to 17 years of schooling, "tertiary degree"), and third place goes to men with upper secondary (11 to 13 years of schooling). 

At age 45, about 15 percent of all men in the 1960-62 cohort with a compulsory education had had children with more than one woman, compared to about 5 percent among men with a tertiary degree. If looking at fathers only (Figure 6), the pattern becomes even more pronounced. At the lowest educational level, 19.3 percent of those who had become fathers, had children with more than one woman, compared to 6.1 percent of those at the highest educational level. (Lappegård et al. 2011)

As for the second point, Lappegård et al. (2011) found that reproductive success is more variable among men with the lowest level of education. Such men have the highest rate of childlessness of all three groups, while having the highest level of multi-partner fertility. Moreover, multi-partner fertility has increased over time among these men, while childlessness has remained constant. Their overall reproductive success has thus gone up:

Like childlessness, multi-partner fertility has increased across cohorts, but unlike childlessness it has increased more among men with lower education than among those with higher education. From the 1940-44 cohort to the 1960-62 cohort the proportion of fathers who had children with more than one woman more than doubled (from 8.9% to 19.3%) in the compulsory schooling group, while it only rose by about 30% in the highest tertiary group, from 4.7 to 6.1 percent. (Lappegård et al. 2011)

Thomson et al. (2014) made the same observation:

In all countries [Australia, United States, Norway, Sweden], however, education is negatively associated with childbearing across partnerships, and the differentials increased from the 1970s to the 2000s.

Moreover, official statistics do not fully capture multi-partner fatherhood. It can be difficult to identify the paternity of children whose biological father is little more than a sperm donor. LappegÃ¥rd et al. (2011) allude to this difficulty: "some of these men have never been in a stable relationship with the mother." This is less of a problem in Norway, where "only about 1-1.5 percent of the total number of children has no registered father."  The registered "father" may nonetheless be a cuckolded husband or a boyfriend who has agreed to assume paternity of the unborn child. The second situation is not uncommon if the woman is still young and attractive.

It seems, then, that modern Norwegian culture is facilitating the reproductive success of low IQ men. One such man was Anders Breivik's stepfather:

My stepfather Tore, one of my best friends Marius and my more distant friends Kristoffer, Sturla and Ronny are all living manifestations of the complete breakdown of sexual moral. All five have had more than 300 sexual partners (two of them more than 700) and I know for a fact that three of them have one or more STDs (probably all of them).

[...] My mother was infected by genital herpes by her boyfriend (my stepfather), Tore, when she was 48. Tore, who was a captain in the Norwegian Army, had more than 500 sexual partners and my mother knew this but suffered from lack of good judgement and moral due to several factors (media - glorification of certain stereotypes being one).

[...] Tore, my stepfather, worked as a major in the Norwegian military and is now retired. I still have contact with him although now he spends most his time (retirement) with prostitutes in Thailand. He is a very primitive sexual beast, but at the same time a very likable and good guy. (Breivik 2011)


The evidence from Iceland

Iceland isn't Norway but it is culturally similar. According to a recent study, the genetic basis of intelligence has been declining in that country since the cohort born in 1910. The authors used a "polygenic score," based on alleles associated with high educational attainment, to measure the genetic potential for academic achievement from generation to generation:

Here, we investigate the effect of this genetic component on the reproductive history of 109,120 Icelanders and the consequent impact on the gene pool over time. We show that an educational attainment polygenic score, POLYEDU, constructed from results of a recent study is associated with delayed reproduction (P < 10-100) and fewer children overall. The effect is stronger for women and remains highly significant after adjusting for educational attainment. Based on 129,808 Icelanders born between 1910 and 1990, we find that the average POLYEDU has been declining at a rate of ~0.010 standard units per decade, which is substantial on an evolutionary timescale.

This is the same polygenic score I've discussed in previous posts, such as Frost (2018). Certain genetic variants are associated with high educational attainment and others with low educational attainment. Do these variants determine our capacity for intelligence? For the most part, yes, but I suspect that many of them have a stronger bearing on time preference or willingness to sit still in a classroom. The authors concede this point:

We postulate that, in addition to being correlated with cognitive ability (32, 33), POLYEDU is capturing a portion of the propensity to long-term planning and delayed gratification. (Kong et al. 2017)

These other traits still matter. Together, they form a mental/behavioral package that coevolved with the rising middle class over the last millennium, eventually spreading through all social strata (Clark 2007; Clark 2009a; Clark 2009b). That evolution is now unravelling. Reproductive success is shifting toward individuals with "fast life-history": lower cognitive ability, weaker orientation toward the future, and, for men, a larger number of sexual partners with less investment in the resulting offspring (Frost 2012; but see also JayMan 2012). This shift began seventy years before the decline in IQ scores.

It seems, then, that the Flynn effect has masked a longer-term decline in the genetic basis of intelligence and other mental/behavioral traits. This is in line with other recent findings. Woodley et al. (2013) argue that mean reaction time has increased in Great Britain by 13 points since Victorian times, although this finding may be an artefact of better sampling of the general population over time (hbd* chick, 2013). Another study, however, using Swedish subjects, has confirmed this lengthening of reaction time, particularly in cohorts born since the 1970s (Madison 2014; Madison et al. 2016).


Conclusion

The recent reversal of the Flynn effect seems to result from two trends:

1. a positive trend based on increasing familiarity with tests and test-taking, as well as improvements in nutrition and a more stimulating learning environment;

2. a negative trend due to dysgenic factors.

For most of the 20th century the positive trend overwhelmed the negative trend. In Norway, the negative trend has had the upper hand in post-1975 cohorts, partly because the positive trend has exhausted all room for improvement and partly because the current culture is facilitating the reproductive success of sexy, low-IQ men.

I've long believed that human evolution didn't stop in the Pleistocene. Nor did it slow down. In fact, we've changed much more over the past 10,000 years than over the previous 100,000, and I'm talking here not only about our outward appearance but also about our inward qualities of mind and behavior. But we can quickly lose what we so quickly gained. This reverse evolution is now taking place, and it’s visible even in the relatively closed system of Iceland's gene pool.

I used to be unconcerned about dysgenics. Any negative trends would surely take hundreds of years to produce serious consequences. So we would have plenty of time to get all of the relevant facts, discuss everything thoroughly with everyone, and reach a consensus. Well, I was wrong. Our dystopic future is close at hand.


References

Bratsberg, B., and O. Rogeberg. (2018). Flynn effect and its reversal are both environmentally caused. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jun 2018, DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1718793115
https://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718793115  

Breivik, A. (2011). A European declaration of independence.
https://publicintelligence.net/anders-behring-breiviks-complete-manifesto-2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence/

Clark, G. (2007). A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford.

Clark, G. (2009a) The indicted and the wealthy: surnames, reproductive success, genetic selection and social class in pre-industrial England.
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/Farewell%20to%20Alms/Clark%20-Surnames.pdf

Clark, G. (2009b). The domestication of man: The social implications of Darwin. ArtefaCTos 2: 64-80.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277275046_The_Domestication_of_Man_The_Social_Implications_of_Darwin

Flynn, J.R. (2007). What is Intelligence? Beyond the Flynn Effect. Cambridge University Press.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=qvBipuypYUkC&printsec=frontcover&hl=fr&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

Frost, P. (2018). A new yardstick. Evo and Proud, May 14
http://evoandproud.blogspot.com/2018/05/a-new-yardstick.html

Frost, P. (2012). Are the cads outbreeding the dads? Evo and Proud, November 3
http://evoandproud.blogspot.com/2012/11/are-cads-outbreeding-dads.html

Hbd* chick (2013). a response to a response to two critical commentaries on woodley, te nijenhuis & murphy (2013), hbd* chick, May 27
http://hbdchick.wordpress.com/2013/05/27/a-response-to-a-response-to-two-critical-commentaries-on-woodley-te-nijenhuis-murphy-2013/

JayMan (2012). It's not the cads, it's the tramps. JayMan's Blog, December 28

Kong, A., M.L. Frigge, G. Thorleifsson, H. Stefansson, A.I. Young, F. Zink, G.A. Jonsdottir, A. Okbay, P. Sulem, G. Masson, D.F. Gudbjartsson, A. Helgason, G. Bjornsdottir, U. Thorsteinsdottir, and K. Stefansson. (2017). Selection against variants in the genome associated with educational attainment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(5): E727-E732.

Lappegård, T., Rønsen, M., & Skrede, K. (2011). Fatherhood and fertility. Fathering 9: 103-120.

Madison, G. (2014). Increasing simple reaction times demonstrate decreasing genetic intelligence in Scotland and Sweden, London Conference on Intelligence, Psychological comments, April 25
#LCI14 Conference proceedings

Madison, G., M.A. Woodley of Menie, and J. Sänger. (2016). Secular Slowing of Auditory Simple Reaction Time in Sweden (1959-1985). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, August 18
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00407/full

Teasdale, T.W., and D.R. Owen. (2005). A long-term rise and recent decline in intelligence test performance: The Flynn Effect in reverse. Personality and Individual Differences 39(4): 837-843.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.01.029

Thomson, E., T. Lappegård, M. Carlson, A. Evans, and E. Gray (2014). Childbearing across partnerships in Australia, the United States, Norway, and Sweden. Demography 51(2): 485-508
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-013-0273-6

Woodley, M.A., J. Nijenhuis, and R. Murphy. (2013). Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time. Intelligence 41: 843-850.
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e8cc/634169c7c5d3e4738fe08091c86177be1380.pdf